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'Professor Emeritus, Department of Agricultural and Applied
Economics,  University  of Minnesota,  St. Paul.I.  Introduction
A lasting impression upon  any visitor to  the former  Soviet Union who comes from
the Middle West or Great Plains of the United States in how very much  alike the two
areas are.  This similarity can be defined  in several dimensions,  apart from the
topographic.
One is  the similarity  in attitudes  toward space  and time.  Unlike western Europe
or the Eastern  United States, transport  costs are  a major part of total production costs  in
mid-America  and in what was the  USSR.  Each  European nation lies within  a single
time  zone;  it takes four time zones to cross the continental  U.S.,  six time zones to
include  Hawaii and most of Alaska,  and seven to pick up Alaska's western tips.  It takes
eleven  time zones to  encompass  the former Soviet Union.
This time-distance  relationship  breeds a consciousness  of wide variations in
climate, land use  and politics, in both America  and the newly formed  confederation  of
Independent  States, or CIS.  It also yields a sense  of remoteness from centers  of power.
The attitudes of ranchers  in New  Mexico or wheat growers  in Montana toward
Washington have much in  common with views of Moscow held by sheep herders in
Uzbekstan or  Kazakh wheat and barley growers.  Government  is far away.
Consider  one state, Kazakhstan.  It is 3.9 times the  size of Texas,  6.6 times the
size of California,  and includes an area equal to 35  percent of the continental  U.S.  Its
capital city, Alma Ata, near the Chinese border, is some  1500 miles from its
northwestern  border, approximately  the  distance from Dallas,  Texas, to San Francisco,
California.  The spatial problems of governance  are awesome.II.  Some Key Economic Variables
Restructuring  the economy of the former  Soviet Union must begin with  a
recognition  that it has been a colonial empire, held  together by military force,  and
organized  along  semi-feudal  lines.  Its reorganization  is triggering  three simultaneous
revolutions:
1.)  The severing of feudal-like  relationships  between the rulers and those  ruled
2.)  The severing of colonial ties between the  central power  and the colonies
3.)  A religious  reformation
The states  emerging  from the Soviet  Union, in short, are  experiencing the  trauma
that in Western Europe was associated  with the break-up of feudalism,  the Reformation,
and decolonization.  This  is telescoping  six centuries  of Western European  evolution into
a few years.
In telescoping  these  three revolutions,  certain  economic variables  will play critical
roles.  It will be wrenching  to acknowledge  that:
1.)  Credit is  credit, not welfare
2.)  Interest is  a cost of the use of capital, not a tribute  or payment by a subject
to a sovereign.
3.)  Property rights are efficient arrangements  for conveying information, and
not just permits for the exercise  of monopoly  power.
4.)  Profits are essential  for the growth of capital.
5.)  Prices that fluctuate  are an essential element of a market economy.
2Those who planned  the coup of August  19-20,  1991  might well  have had the
passive  support of the majority  of the people in the USSR.  As  a whole,  they are
unfamiliar with uncertainty.  The old  order was repressive, but it was stable,  or seemed
to be.  Among the peoples  of the world, they have had the  most thorough  training  in
stability  of expectations.
As of about mid-1990:
1.)  Rental rates for government  housing had not been changed since  1928.
2.)  Bread prices  at government  stores were unchanged  since the  1950's.
3.)  Fares  on the subway in  Moscow in  1990 were  the same as  they had been
when I was there  in September  1958.
4.)  The basic retirement  pension of 60 to 70 rubles per month had been
unchanged for  decades.
This situation was changed  drastically  by piece-meal  price reform in  1989-90 and
by more comprehensive  ones of April,  1991,  and in Russia after Jan. 2,  1992.  The  fact
remains that the  peoples  of the former  Soviet Union had the longest continuous period
of stable consumer prices of any large  population in moder  times.  Fluctuating prices  to
them are  especially  frightening.
The transition  to a market  economy will be especially  difficult in those sectors  in





Irrational prices in these sectors are reflected  in:
a)  What is produced
b)  Where it is produced
c)  At what scale it  is produced
d)  Who benefits
The most fundamental distortions  have arisen from the lack of a price on land
and natural resources.  This reflects  a failure  to recognize  the fact that a market
economy  involves markets for inputs  as well as for outputs--for factors of production  as
well as for products.
Most of the past interest  in creating a market  economy in the USSR focused  on
product  markets and especially  on retail markets.  These are the  easiest to visualize  in
action,  and rudimentary markets  of this type already existed.  It is more difficult  to
conceptualize  wholesale  markets.  Their emergence was a more  direct threat to the
principles  of a planned economy,  and there were few if any in existence  that could serve
as role models.
The most direct threat to  the ideology guiding a planned  economy  arises from the
prospect of a market  for land.  Yet without a market for land,  and by extension,  for real
estate, there  can be no reliable  guide to the value  of the most basic  input in production.
This  is the reason why attempts  to transform  a centrally planned economy into  a
market economy have  foundered  on the land  question.  Without  a price  on land that is
4related  to its relative  value as an input in production there  can be no  market-derived
basis for choosing  among production  alternatives  involving  space  and time.
III.  Some  Consequences  of the Inability  of Socialist  Economies to  Reallocate Production Resources
The economic  system in the former  USSR proved  able  to allocate  funds  derived
from growth  in resource  productivity.  When growth slowed  down  or stopped,  the
socialist system inhibited  the  reallocation of resources  among competing sectors.  One
basic  reason was the lack  of "a mechanism  which  provides a rational  choice  between
investment projects  and the  effective use of investment  funds" (Chubais  and Vasil'ev, p.
58.)'
The  symbol of this defect was the absence  of a functional  rate of interest.  With
no firm guide  for reallocation,  the bureaucratic  inertia  of the old  system prevented  any
redistribution of new investment.
Mobility  of population  was historically low in the USSR.  Fragmentation  into
independent republics will further retard mobility,  and especially in  the short run.  This
will be a major barrier to the  restructuring of productive  activity, and its relocation.  The
result  will almost surely be that "the new production  system will be created on the  base
of the rebuilt  enterprises of the traditional  technology systems,  and the organizational
'Anatolii  B. Chubais and Sergei V.  Vasil'ev,  "Privatization  as a Necessary  Condition for Structural  Change  in the USSR,"  Communist  Economies  and Economic Transformation,  Vol. 3, No.  1, 1991,  pp.  57-62.
5form of this transition is the absorption of the  old enterprises  by the new corporations"
(Chubais  and Vasil'ev, p. 61).
Western-type market economics  developed  on the base  of an asset structure
dominated by the private  ownership of rural land.  The evolution of legal  systems,
customs, and traditions  regarding property rights  involved a rural  to urban transition.
The creation of market economics  in what was the  Soviet Union is reversing  this
process.  The type forms  of private enterprises  are being created  in  the cities, leading
some economists to conclude that 'The breakthrough in privatization of the economy will
therefore  most probably occur in the  industrial sector" (Aleksashenko  and Grigoriev,  p.
45).  "From the point of view  of social consciousness  and ideology privatization of large-
scale  industry in the form of joint-stock companies may in fact appear easier than
privatization  of land  and enterprises in trade and services"  (Ibid., p. 50.)2
IV.  Some Possible  Consequences  of the Collapse of Communist Agriculture
The collapse  of communism  and the efforts to shift to  private property may
depreciate  the status  of peasants or farm workers.
In the  USSR, the deficient  supplies in state food  stores made possible the growth
of collective  farm or cooperative  markets  that provided  an outlet for the products  of
small-plot agriculture.  Any future  expansion of private farming is likely to cause  an
2Sergei V. Aleksashenko  and Leonid  M. Grigoriev, "Privatization and the Capital
Market," Communist Economies  and Economic  Transformation, Vol. 3,  No. 1, 1991,  pp.
41-56.
6increase in the production  of the types  of products formerly produced  on the old  private
plots, and consequent  declines in prices.
This seems likely  to reduce  the  attractiveness of work  on the  collective  and state
farms.  In the past, the  opportunity  to produce  and market food  products from private-
plots was one of the principal  forces holding agricultural  labor on the collective  and state
farms.  If the supplemental  income  from this  source declines  it will be more difficult  for
the big farms to hold their labor supply.  This  could lead to rising  labor costs  on the big
farms,  and rural depopulation.
The initial result of the collapse  of communism may be to increase  the income of
private-plot  producers, as the  old distribution system breaks down and food becomes
scarce  in the  cities.  This situation  might prevail through  two winters.  A longer run
effect  may be to stimulate production  and reduce the scarcity prices  the private-plot
producers  now enjoy.
One prospect  could be  an increase  in labor costs  on big farms, forcing recognition
of their inefficiency,  and a fall  in income from private  plots, leading  to widespread
abandonment.  This will reveal  the fact that  the big farms are too big, and the small
plots are too small.  This could lead to the  emergence of farm units carved out of former
collective  or state farms  that could be large  enough  to hold their labor supply by
providing full-time employment  for one or several families.
This will take time.  Only a limited amount of farm equipment suited for farms  of
this  size is now being  produced.  A credit system serving farms of this size  does not exist.
Management  practices  and work norms have been tailored to relatively large work
7groups or brigades, organized  around  the principle  of job specialization.  Farm policy
and practices  in the USSR produced  specialists, not generalists.  A major change  in
orientation toward  farm work will be  needed  and this seems unlikely to occur until  a new
generation takes  command.
This process  will be  accelerated  by the collapse  of the  ruble.  This will have  the
effect  of increasing  the attractiveness  of owning a tract  of land.  Land will appreciate  in
value.
The existence  of this situation at a time when  private property in land is being
created  can easily result in land values  that are  abnormally high.  If the value of land,  in
a situation of collapsing value  of the currency,  is used as  a basis for land  purchase
obligations  or credit extension,  then the land will almost surely be over-valued.  This may
blight the effect of privatization,  by burdening  new private land  owners with land values
that cannot be sustained over the long run.
Privatizing  agricultural  land when the currency is collapsing will thus  insure that
no market process  of valuing  land can be used.  The  result seems likely to be some form
of payment system based  on commodities,  coupled with ceilings  on land holdings  set in
terms  of hectares.  A precedent for this solution was  set by the land reform in Taiwan
after  1951,  with payment  denominated  in bonds pegged to  rice and sweet potato prices.
Can we anticipate  wheat and barley bonds in the  former USSR?
8V.  Land Tenure:  Shakeout  After the  Collapse  of Communism
The historical  record is full of cases in which bound  peasants, serfs,  or slaves have
been converted  into sharecroppers.  With some  exceptions,  this  has been an almost
universal  stage  in the  evolution of land tenure  systems.
One interpretation  of the  events now underway  in the former  Soviet Union  is to
regard  them  as an accelerated  and telescoped  version of the conversion  of serfs into
sharecroppers.  A number of attempts were  made before  1990 to  reform the  structure of
Soviet farming  by assigning  land, and sometimes livestock and machinery, to work
brigades or even smaller  family groups  that would  in effect be contract  farmers,
operating under the  oversight of the collective or state farms.  Under these  schemes,  the
farms  resembled landlords,  and the contract  farmers acquired many of the  characteristics
of share tenants, contributing primarily their labor.
Prior  to the collapse  of the Soviet system  these schemes were  never very
widespread,  and there were many variations.  But some familiarity with  this  approach to
the organization of agricultural  production had been acquired,  and there were supporters
in the  republics  and even in some  central ministries.
With  the collapse  of centralized  power over land use decisions,  and the chaotic
state of the debate  over land ownership,  it seems  likely that an attempt will be made  to
salvage  the organizational  structure  of the  existing collective  and state  farm by speeding
up their  conversion to functions  similar to those exercised by  landlords under share-
cropping systems.
9In the short-run,  there is scarcely  any alternative.  There  is no  stock of equipment
suitable  for family sized farms.  Buildings  for livestock  and storage  and handling
equipment for  field crops  are centralized  and large  scale.  There  is no system  of
production credit  for small-scale  producers.  There  are many parallels with the situation
that prevailed in southern states at the  end of the American  Civil  War.
There  are  also important  differences.  The  institutional  structure  to support
individual risk-takers  is almost  totally lacking in the  states of the former Soviet  Union.
There  is no locally  available  system for the registration  of title to land.  Farm mortgage
credit  is virtually unknown.  There  is no body of contract law tailored  to the needs  of
individual  business enterprises  or farms.  Transfer  of funds by the use of bank checks  or
negotiable  instruments  (warehouse  receipts  or bills of lading)  has never developed.
Insurance for private business  risk does not exist.
These  and many other institutional  defects  make it likely that, whatever
managerial  forms  evolve  from the  collapse of communism, the  farm structure  that
emerges  will resemble  a share-cropping  system.
A contractual  basis for this evolution already  exists in many western-style  market
economies.  Poultry  and eggs,  many types  of vegetable  crops,  and fed  livestock are
increasingly  being produced  in the United States under bailee  contracts  that represent
modern  and highly commercial  variants  of share-cropping  contracts.  The grafting of this
form of business  organization  in farming to the remnants  of the structure of communist
agriculture  can be expected.
10VI.  The Dominant Role  of Land Policy in Socialist Thought
Land policy has been central  to the Soviet version of socialism  from the
beginning.  It nurtured the  revolution, and was central  to Stalin's redefinition  of goals  in
the collectivization  drive after  1928.  Gorbachev's  inability to surrender  a belief in the
merits of the common ownership  of land was his  most emphatic difference  with Yeltsin.
Historians may well judge Gorbachev's  decline  and fall to center on his doctrinaire
refusal to endorse the privatization  of land.  With  almost everything else Yeltsin was
proposing  Gorbachev  could agree, but not that.
The struggle  over land policy is still unresolved.  Russian President Boris  Yeltsin
has  declared in favor of privatization.  Ukrainian President  Leonid  M. Kravchuk has
declared himself opposed.  Even in Ukraine the policy split is sharp, with privatization
favored in western  regions and opposed  in eastern  districts containing the bigger farms
and most of the population of Russian descent.
In general, the debate  over land policy has been submerged  or suppressed  in
those states in which the bureaucratic  apparatus  of government is still dominated by
hold-overs from the Soviet regime.  This  includes,  in varying  degree, the Central Asian
Muslim states, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Kazakhstan.
Land policy remains the  key indicator of the  extent to which members  of the
Commonwealth  of Independent  States  are prepared  to reform doctrinaire  socialism at its
root.  No other economic  issue  is as profound  in its ability to  set the tone for new
regimes.  At this  stage  in the evolution of the CIS it must be reported that the central
issue of the privatization of land has yet to be confronted.  Any resolution  is years if not
decades  away.
11